Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom

One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.--

שנה

2010

שפה

English

סדרה

Operation Iraqi Freedom key decisions monograph series -- v. 1

הוצאה

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

מהדורות

1

עמודים

67

ISBN

9781584874263

מקור הנתונים: Wikidata