Does God have a nature?

Sets of contingent objects, perhaps, are as contingent as their members; but properties, propositions, numbers and states of affairs, it seems, are objects whose non-existence is quite impossible. If so, however, how are they related to God? Suppose God has a nature: a property he has essentially that includes each property essential to him. Does God have a nature? And if he does, is there a conflict between God's sovereignty and his having a nature? How is God related to such abstract objects as properties and propositions? These are the questions I want to explore. - Introduction.

שנה

1980

שפה

English

סדרה

The Aquinas lecture ; 44 (1980)

הוצאה

Marquette University Press

מהדורות

1

עמודים

146

ISBN

9780874621457

מקור הנתונים: Wikidata