Preferences and well-being

Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being.--Publisher description.

שנה

2006

שפה

English

סדרה

Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement -- 59

הוצאה

Cambridge University Press

מהדורות

4

עמודים

279

ISBN

9780521695589

מקור הנתונים: Wikidata