The constitution of selves

An amnesia victim who asks "Who am I?" means something different from a confused adolescent asking the same question. Marya Schechtman takes issue with analytic philosophy's emphasis on the first sort of question to the exclusion of the second. The problem of personal identity, she suggests, is usually understood to be a question about historical life. What she calls the "reidentification question" is taken to be the real metaphysical question of personal identity, whereas questions about beliefs or values and the actions they prompt - the "characterization question" - are often presented as merely metaphorical. Failure to recognize the philosophical importance of both, Schechtman argues, has undermined analytic philosophy's attempts to offer a satisfying account of personal identity. Considerations related to the characterization question creep unrecognized into discussions of reidentification, with the result that neither question is adequately addressed. Schechtman shows how separating the two allows for a more fruitful approach to the reidentification question, and she develops her own narrative account of characterization.

המשפט הראשון: Facts about personal identity stand at the core of our ordinary practice and lay the foundations for our day-to-day interactions.

שנה

1996

שפה

English

הוצאה

Cornell University Press

מהדורות

1

עמודים

192

ISBN

9780801474170

מקור הנתונים: Wikidata