The law and economics of public health

The fundamental question addressed by this paper is whether or not and the extent to which imposing tort liability on potential injurers improves the public's health. Conceptually, imposing the threat of litigation on potential injurers gives them an incentive to exercise more care than they would absent the threat. While the conclusion might seem to be obvious at first glance, in reality, the conclusion is far from obvious. For one, insurance coverage may blunt incentives to take care. Also, the tort system may operate far less perfectly than the theory would have it. In the end, the question must be answered on the basis of empirical evidence.

שנה

2007

שפה

English

סדרה

Foundations and trends in microeconomics -- v. 3, issue 5-6

הוצאה

Now

מהדורות

2

עמודים

162

ISBN

9781601980755

מקור הנתונים: Wikidata